Why Felix Pal thinks RSS is an 'aloof parent' of the Sangh Parivar

The Federal spoke to Felix Pal, a lecturer in political science and international relations at the University of Western Australia, on how the RSS-led Sangh Parivar functions as a global network of organisations. Drawing from his long-term research mapping Sangh-linked entities across countries, Pal explains how the ecosystem operates through overlapping personnel, shifting fronts, and layered institutions.

Edited excerpts:

You describe the RSS as an “aloof parent” in relation to its affiliated bodies. Why that phrase?

I think one of the challenges of describing the RSS is that it is both an organisation and a constellation of organisations. It is very difficult to find singular words that capture the entirety of what we are talking about.

The language of an “aloof parent” is designed to indicate that the RSS is reluctant to acknowledge its links with many organisations it has either directly founded or organisations founded by people it has trained who then went on to found other organisations.

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One important reason is it's very important for the RSS to portray Hindu nationalism, or the Hindu far right, as a social upsurge—hundreds and thousands of organisations supposedly rising spontaneously, believing the same thing, and joining together in coalition for a Hindu Rashtra. That image becomes difficult to sustain if it is clear that the RSS’s “fingers” are in all these organisations—because then it looks less like an organic upsurge and more like something carefully choreographed.

The RSS is not just the parent of the network, but also the network. In a sense, the “father” is also the “brother”, the “cousin”, the “niece”, the “aunt”.

This is also where the limitations of terminology like “family” come in. It can give a false impression of completely separate organisations, when in fact many have intricately overlapping networks of personnel, offices, and financial arrangements. In many organisations, you will find RSS pracharaks as organisational secretaries, and swayamsevaks sitting across multiple boards and committees.

So, the RSS is not just the parent of the network. It is also the network. In a sense, the “father” is also the “brother”, the “cousin”, the “niece”, the “aunt”. The metaphor of family can hide that overlap.

You were asked about the BJP’s leadership change and the reported RSS-BJP tussle, including the name Nitin Nabin (working president of the BJP). How do you read such moments?

After the last (2024) election, there has been deep dissatisfaction in the Sangh with elements of the BJP—particularly around the culture of personality around Narendra Modi and the authority given to figures like Amit Shah.

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It is conceivable that there are elements in the Sangh—within the RSS and the BJP—that seek a return to the principle associated with the RSS: prasiddhi-parangmukhta, the aversion to fame and public personality, the idea of the faceless worker.

So one could potentially read leadership choices through that lens. But again, I am cautious because I have not followed the details closely.

In your research, you say conflict inside the Sangh Parivar is “rife”. What kinds of conflict do you mean?

There are numerous areas of potential conflict. From the early decades of the RSS, there was tension between factions who believed RSS activity should be limited to “man-making”—building disciplined citizens in shakhas who would then transform society—and others who argued the Sangh needed to do more, including founding a political party.

That tension between an internally focused vision and a more populist political vision continues in different ways. It is reflected in long-recorded tensions between (RSS chief) Mohan Bhagwat and Narendra Modi, and dissatisfaction in parts of the RSS with the personality-driven political style around Modi.

The language of an “aloof parent” is designed to indicate that the RSS is reluctant to acknowledge its links with many organisations it has either directly founded or organisations founded by people it has trained who then went on to found other organisations.

There are other divisions too—caste dynamics, regional competition, and organisational rivalries across the constellation. We would be silly to assume the Sangh is coherent simply because it says it is coherent.

Any organisation of this size will have conflict. Anyone who has worked in even a small office knows how rife conflict can be. In a constellation of the size we are discussing, that is magnified many thousandfold.

How extensive is the Sangh Parivar’s global presence? Does the RSS operate abroad as the RSS?

The RSS does not function as the RSS outside India. The closest equivalent abroad is typically the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS). It runs shakhas, often with mixed genders, and similar practices like guru dakshina, though it can vary by country.

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We documented Sangh-linked organisational presence in about 40 countries, relying primarily on publicly available online data. That is not exhaustive. I am confident there is more.

The greatest concentrations are in the Global North—particularly the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom.

There is a presence in Southeast Asia too, where there is a large historic South Asian diaspora. There are limitations there because much of that diaspora is Tamil, and Tamil communities have historically been less susceptible to, or less impressed by, the Sangh ecosystem.

There is also a limited presence in East Africa, tied to colonial-era migration. The origins of the overseas Sangh are linked to East Africa—the first overseas shakha experiment is traced to 1948, on a boat to Kenya. In the 1960s, as East African countries decolonised and pursued “Africanisation” policies, many Indians were expelled and moved to Britain. That wave also shaped later expansion patterns in the UK, and then in the US, Canada, and Australia.

Do you see a “pan-Hindu” consciousness in the diaspora that binds this network?

No, I don’t. I don’t think there is even a united Hindu consciousness within India, let alone globally. The internal diversity of what people call Hinduism militates against the Sangh’s organisational idea of “Hindu unity”.

I don’t think there is even a united Hindu consciousness within India, let alone globally. The internal diversity of what people call Hinduism militates against the Sangh’s organisational idea of “Hindu unity”.

The Sangh has an ideological commitment to Hindu sangathan—unity—but it also has to speak the language of respecting diversity within Hinduism depending on the context. That produces what I would call multivocality, or in simple language, double-speak: saying different things in different contexts.

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Critics often treat contradictions as “gotcha” moments. But the Sangh does not need to be coherent. It is not just an ideological phenomenon. It is a material phenomenon.

In the diaspora, for example, people might join a Sangh-linked organisation not because they believe in Hindu supremacy, but because it is the only local space where they do not feel ridiculed for being Indian or Hindu, especially amid racism or discrimination.

Similarly, in India, people may come into contact through service provision—vaccinations, eye camps, schools—especially when other actors are absent. During COVID, the Sangh expanded influence through service work.

Not everyone joining is a caricatured bigot. But the Sangh uses even “innocuous” service organisations as legitimating tools—pointing to them to claim benevolence and social legitimacy, and to draw people closer to the broader network.

You categorise Sangh-linked bodies into types. What do you mean by “cadre-based” organisations?

Like any typology, it is crude because many organisations have dual functions. Cadre-based organisations are those that can mobilise significant numbers. The RSS is an obvious example. Organisations like the BJP are also cadre-driven in their own way. The Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) and the Bharatiya Kisan Sangh can be viewed similarly.

But it is important to note that there are relatively few cadre-based organisations in the Sangh ecosystem. That belies the public image the Sangh likes to project—of a vast permanently mobilised mass.

The overwhelming majority are small feather organisations—sometimes fewer than half a dozen workers. They have no large membership to pull onto the streets.

Mobilisation is episodic. Cadre capacity is activated when the Sangh network thinks it is useful—during elections, or during moments like COVID. It is not that the masses are permanently “on call”.

What are “coordinating” organisations in your framework, and why do they matter?

These are intermediaries between the periphery and the centre. Take an example like Hindu Seva Pratishthan (Karnataka). It is a service umbrella that can sit over multiple affiliated service organisations.

When the Sangh wants to mobilise service activity in a particular district, messages can flow through such coordinating bodies.

They can also serve to obscure ties. For instance, organisations associated with militancy are rarely directly tied to the RSS because that would be a liability. Connections often run through other bodies like the BJP, the VHP, or similar groupings, allowing the RSS to distance itself.

So coordinating organisations can relay information, mobilise resources, and sometimes provide deniability.

How do “campaign organisations” function within this ecosystem?

Sometimes, the Sangh cannot or does not want to operate directly in a particular environment, so it works through campaign organisations.

In disaster relief—say, floods—you can see RSS workers alongside targeted flood-relief committees or campaign bodies. Even if it is the same people doing the same work, multiple banners multiply the apparent scale: “look how many organisations are doing this”. This creates the impression of a coalition of the willing, rather than a single orchestrated network.

These organisational patterns have multiple utilities and can be activated differently depending on the scenario.

Is the Sangh always visible in public—through uniforms, symbols, or the saffron scarf?

Not always. If they were always visible, we wouldn’t know when they weren’t.

It is more useful to examine when and where visibility is chosen. In a village in the Northeast with a Christian majority, Sangh identity may be a liability, so they will operate more quietly.

In other contexts—like flood relief in Odisha—there may be fewer liabilities in being seen as Sangh, so visibility increases.

So, visibility is contextual. The key is paying attention to when and where it is useful to them.

You also identify “showpiece organisations”— why do these exist?

The Sangh is intensely aware of what it is criticised for. It is not an ignorant bulldozer; it is acutely aware that critique can make people reluctant to join or work with them.

So, it is relatively low cost to found showpiece organisations that counter specific criticisms—such as the Samajik Samrasta Manch, the Rashtriya Sikh Sangat, or the Muslim Rashtriya Manch.

These organisations can remain two-dimensional—without large cadre depth—but their existence is useful.

Just having a “Muslim wing” allows the Sangh to signal: “Look, we have Muslim friends.”

This is also internally useful because there is diversity inside the Sangh. Some participants are uncomfortable with mass violence, even if they remain within the ecosystem. Showpiece bodies can reassure such internal constituencies that the Sangh is not simply a violent marauder band.

What do you mean by “knowledge-based” organisations in the Sangh network?

For decades, academic criticism has argued that the Sangh lacks a serious intellectual project. The Sangh has been self-conscious about this.

Over the second half of the 20th century and especially the last 20 years, there has been investment in think tanks and knowledge-production bodies that attempt to build intellectual legitimacy.

These include publishing houses like Suruchi Prakashan and Jan Ganga Prakashan, institutes like Deendayal Shodh Sansthan, and think tanks such as the Vivekananda International Foundation (VIF).

They are part of an effort to be seen as legitimate—especially against what the Sangh frames as a cosmopolitan, liberal, Congress-leaning elite.

What are “last mile” organisations, and why do they matter?

Last mile organisations are the terminus—the interface where the Sangh meets society.

They are often small service organisations—schools, clinics, blood banks, yoga centres. They may have only one dense link into the wider network, rather than many.

Take Vidya Bharati, for example, which lists thousands of associated schools. It is unlikely each school is densely networked. Many may have a single connection into the wider ecosystem.

But these bodies matter because they are where the Sangh “bleeds into” society. They blur into everyday life, building contact at the neighbourhood level.

Finally, what does it mean when Sangh figures say “the Sangh is society” or “society should become the Sangh”?

This reflects an older idea associated with right-wing thinking more broadly: organicism.

In that view, society is a single natural organic unit that can be contaminated by what is framed as “foreign” inputs. In the Sangh’s worldview, Muslims and Christians are often framed as foreign.

The goal is not simply to govern the organism. It is to change it fundamentally in the way the Sangh desires.

And the easiest way to do that, from the Sangh’s perspective, is to incorporate every element of society within its orbit. That is why the Sangh has organisations across everything—old-age homes, schools, universities, unions, publishing houses, political parties, service bodies, and more.

Some of these may be only loosely tied, or not formally tied, to Hindutva as critics conceptualise it. But, the overarching theory of change is becoming society, being present in every aspect of social life as a material constellation.

(The content above has been transcribed from video using a fine-tuned AI model. To ensure accuracy, quality, and editorial integrity, we employ a Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) process. While AI assists in creating the initial draft, our experienced editorial team carefully reviews, edits, and refines the content before publication. At The Federal, we combine the efficiency of AI with the expertise of human editors to deliver reliable and insightful journalism.)