Nepal’s chronic instability a huge worry for India; is Delhi doing enough?

Elections for Nepal’s President and Vice-President, due on March 9 and 17, respectively, have led to sharp fissures in the ruling Left coalition that may unsettle the government headed by Prime Minister Pushp Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda.

Prachanda was sworn in as Nepal’s new Prime Minister in December 2022 after he switched sides to join hands with erstwhile foe and former Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli. His third stint as the head of government in the 14 years since Nepal’s monarchy was abolished has not been pleasant.

Also read: ‘Pro-China’ Prachanda set to take oath as Nepal’s new PM

After Deputy Prime Minister Rabi Lamichanne was forced to resign on January 27 following the Supreme Court declaring his Nepali citizenship as invalid, the chief of the third-largest party in the coalition, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), left the Maoist-Communist alliance but decided to continue to support it from outside.

Political war

That has been followed by bitter factional wrangles within the coalition, with Oli and Prachanda sharply divided over candidates. Oli wants a second term for Bidyadebi Bhandari, chairperson of his party and an upper caste politician, while Prachanda wants a strong janjati (smaller ethnicities) candidate that smaller regional parties in his coalition will support.

This is seen as a Maoist push to consolidate their grip on outlying regions of smaller ethnic groups that had supported the violent Maoist insurgency. If Oli and Prachanda, once bitter foes but now bedfellows of convenience, fall out over who would be the coalition’s candidate for president and his deputy, the coalition may again come crashing.

Also read: Prachanda becomes Nepal PM as big powers vie for nation’s control

Sher Bahadur Deuba’s Nepali Congress, believed to be India’s favourite, like Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League in Bangladesh, is the single largest party in the 275-member parliament, with 89 seats. While Oli upstaged Deuba in the game of musical chairs after a hung parliament following last year’s election, he may now find Deuba only too eager to topple the coalition.

Triangular game

Until recently, Prachanda was in a pre-election alliance with former Prime Minister Deuba, who led a five-party alliance of Nepali Congress. It was expected to form a government after the November 2022 elections, winning the largest number of seats. But Prachanda walked out after Deuba justly turned down his demand for the prime minister’s post.

On Christmas day, former rivals Prachanda and Oli drove together to stake claim to the President with a letter of support from 170 MPs, well ahead of the half-way mark of 138.

The two communist parties — Prachanda’s Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) and Oli’s Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) — were supported by some smaller parties, to add to the UML’s 78 seats and the Maoist Centre’s 32.

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The third-largest in the coalition is the new GenNext-centric Rastriya Swatantra Party, which won an impressive 20 seats, Nagarik Unmukti Party led by murder convict Resham Chaudhary, Janamat Party led by CK Raut with its base in Eastern Tarai, and the Janata Samajbadi Party.

A volte-face

But the biggest surprise was sprung by the pro-monarchy Rastriya Prajatantra Party, which joined the Left coalition with 14 members. This party, which attacks the US, the European Union, and India for their “active” involvement in Nepal’s transition to a federal and secular republic from a unitary Hindu state, has now moved off after its leader Ravi Lamichhane was removed as Deputy Prime Minister.

Many believe he withdrew his party from the coalition government so that Prime Minister Prachanda does not appoint another RSP leader in his place who could upstage him as its supremo.

The Nepal Congress-led coalition might have succeeded had Deuba agreed to allow Prachanda to be Prime Minister despite the Maoists having half the number of seats compared to Nepal Congress.

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But not only did he have 89 seats but, as he often boasted, his party enjoyed the “support of both Washington and Delhi”. Indeed, the US and Indian ambassadors frequently met Deuba and Prachanda to ensure their alliance sustained.

Dragon’s shadow 

After the departure in early January of Hou Yanqi, Beijing’s most high-profile envoy yet in Nepal who had stitched together the 2018 communist alliance (which fell in 2021), the Chinese had been on the backfoot.

But Deuba’s determination to head the government drove the Maoists towards Oli, with some nudging from China. Maoist Centre General Secretary Barshaman Pun, who has always favoured an alliance between the two communist parties, returned recently after spending two weeks in China, reportedly for medical treatment, and played a key role in bringing Oli and Prachanda together.

President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, who is close to Oli, supports the coming together of Left forces, and was hardly comfortable with a Deuba-Prachanda alliance.

India’s challenge

For India, Deuba as Prime Minister was the best option, like Hasina in power in Dhaka. Delhi views Oli as pro-China, and the coming together of communist forces to form a government is a turning back of the clock from its point of view.

After the bitterness in ties during Oli’s 2015-16 and 2018-21 government, India-Nepal relations had improved after Deuba became prime minister in 2021.

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But Indian diplomats and spymasters, who often play a not-too-concealed role in government-making in Kathmandu, should have been able to “manage” Deuba and goaded him to allow Prachanda to head the government just to keep Oli out of power and China on the backfoot.

India dearly missed out on Abhijit Haldar’s ability that had helped torpedo the Oli-Prachanda alliance in 2021. Like Hasina, Deuba is always suspicious of any move by Delhi to prioritise other political parties, especially the Maoists.

India had played a major role in bringing the Nepal Maoists to the table — more to avoid a trans-regional Maoist war coalition between Indian and Nepal comrades than to create a Red government in Kathmandu. But in the process, India ended up bringing down the monarchy and surrendering the “Hindu card” that accounted for the special relations manifested in the terms of the 1950 treaty.

Losing in Nepal

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s praying at Pashupatinath temple cannot revive that “Hindu card” because Delhi surrendered to the Western agenda of establishing a secular republic and is now having to put up with increasing conversions.

Then, Delhi’s not-so-covert backing for economic blockades (to play the uncertain “Madhesi” card) has been a disaster and has led to huge anti-Indian sentiment. Friends in high places in Kathmandu point to India losing Nepali support because it went overboard in articulating Madhesi aspirations on advice of some senior diplomats with roots in Bihar, where Madhesis enjoy kinship ties.

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The Agniveer scheme, raising uncertainties of Gorkha recruitment in the Indian army, seems to be the final nail.

Unless these contentious issues — and the border — is carefully and dispassionately addressed and Delhi develops a fine-tuned strategy to maintain the special relations, India is destined to lose out in yet another key country in its neighbourhood.

(The writer is a former BBC correspondent and an author on South Asian conflicts)

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