Spread of Hindutva is blurring caste divisions and regional faultlines

Amid much talk of Hindu-Muslim polarisation in the last few years, what has gone largely unnoticed is the easing of another polarisation that defined Indian polity: one on the axis of caste and region.

The BJP has sought to expand in the last eight years by deepening its influence among diverse caste groups in its core regions of influence and expanding beyond the geographical core at the expense of parties that were entrenched there. In the process, faultlines of the days when Mandal politics became a dominant trend, and the coalition era led to regional competition becoming more pronounced, have been contained, though not obliterated.

This is a key takeaway of the rise of the BJP under Narendra Modi that is often lost amid a news cycle that shows the deepening of the Hindu-Muslim fault line.

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What did India look like after the decline of the Congress in the late 1980s? It saw three processes coming up all at once. One was the rise of Hindutva around the Ram Janmabhoomi movement. Another was the rise of caste faultlines with the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations.

This process was particularly pronounced in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which together sent 120 MPs to the Lok Sabha. After initial success in UP due to the wave generated by the Ram temple movement, the caste faultline became dominant; the Samajwadi Party got a large chunk of OBCs, the Bahujan Samaj Party large sections of Dalits and some lower OBCs, and the BJP, with an upper caste base, had to stay contented with just a few OBC and Dalit groups as its voters.

Caste no longer an antidote to Hindutva

The rise of caste-based regional parties in UP and Bihar led to a belief among the intelligentsia that caste was an antidote to Hindutva. This belief has been shattered in recent years, but this has also led to caste faultlines in North India becoming somewhat blurred. Incidents like the suicide of Rohith Vemula and the rise of the Bhim Army did create a buzz in media columns. However, in reality, the BSP was on the decline and many parties once associated with Dalit votes were NDA allies.

The BJP’s active attempts at providing greater representation to SCs, STs and OBCs have borne fruit. The representation of non-Yadav OBCs in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly went up in 2017 itself. Both in 2017 and 2022, the state has had an OBC Deputy Chief Minister, a clear message to the large OBC population. The last Union cabinet expansion saw more than 50 per cent appointees coming from among OBC, Dalit and Adivasi groups. The UP council of ministers also has a majority of OBCs and SCs, including three Dalit women.

As the presidential term of Ramnath Kovind, a Dalit, ends, the country is set to have Droupadi Murmu, a tribal, as its President. Among the nominees for the Rajya Sabha is renowned music composer Ilaiyaraaja, a Dalit from Tamil Nadu.

The trend is in line with recent research by academic Badri Narayan and the coinage of the term ‘subaltern Hindutva’ by political scientist Sajjan Kumar.

The third process that was noticed after 1989 was the strengthening of regional politics and identities. The decline of the Congress in North India since 1989 meant the party was no longer able to command Lok Sabha majorities, and coalitions with regional parties were the only way to power for both the Congress and its rising Hindutva rival, the BJP.

The growing dominance of regional parties made the language of regional aspirations and distinctiveness central to Indian politics. The Centre was weakened and the states strengthened. Regional diversity, rather than convergence, defined the polity, from Uttar Pradesh to Tamil Nadu and from Bihar to the North-East.

Convergence of regional identities

This process is also getting reversed as the BJP expands geographically. Regional identities do remain – like in Maharashtra or Assam – but they are no longer positioned as a counter to Delhi. In states like Tamil Nadu, where the BJP has not been able to make inroads, and Bengal, where the BJP improved its showing but not to the extent that it could storm to power, the language of regional distinctiveness still dominates.

The split in the Shiv Sena – and the inability of the MNS to make much headway – is in some senses a sign that the Marathi identity is electorally not as saleable in Maharashtra as Hindutva is. The story of Assam is the same: the strong sense of Assamese identity vis-à-vis Bengali-speaking migrants has made common cause with the larger Hindutva discourse that has seen illegal migration from Bangladesh as a problem.

What has been traced above is a trend; something that is still in progress. Whether the BJP expands further or the trend gets bucked is something only time will tell.

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However, it is amply clear that faultlines of caste and region are not as powerful today as they were 20 years ago, as the spread of Hindutva is able to provide a common electoral and religio-cultural platform to the so-called upper and lower caste groups among Hindus and also able to bind the electoral aspirations of people across several states around the personality of the Prime Minister. This is what leads to the jump in the votes polled by the BJP in Lok Sabha elections in many parts of India, when compared with keener contests in the same states during assembly polls.

Hindu-Muslim faultlines deepen

However, the more this process obliterates caste and regional fault lines – producing a sense of a diverse and yet palpable ‘national’ Hindu self – the more is the Hindu-Muslim faultline likely to deepen, unless the government makes very conscious efforts to contain the polarisation or Muslims and the liberal intelligentsia accept the direction society is moving in as a fait accompli.

The rise of Narendra Modi gave a fillip to this process of convergence around the axis of caste and region and unease on the question of religious polarisation. However, now it is society that is driving the process, and the continuing victories of Modi and the BJP are a sign that the change is becoming the new normal.

(Vikas Pathak is a journalist and media educator. The views expressed are personal.)  

(The Federal seeks to present views and opinions from all sides of the spectrum. The information, ideas or opinions in the articles are of the author and do not reflect the views of The Federal)