Rahul's Wayanad decision pragmatic, but betrays lack of guts

In his 1994 hit Dumb and Dumber, Jim Carrey asks Lauren Holly what are the chances of a “guy like her and a girl like him ending up together?”

Holly replies: “Not good, I would say one in a million.”

Carrey’s face lights up with a smile as he says: “So, you are saying, there is a chance?”

So, like Carrey, let us imagine for a moment that there is one in a million chance of somebody chanting a spell that makes Amethi, Rahul Gandhi’s traditional seat, vanish. Then, consider Rahul Gandhi’s options as he searches for a seat to contest the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.

When a leader of his stature searches for a constituency, two things have to be kept in the mind. First, the guarantee of a victory; second, the freedom to campaign in rest of the country without worrying about their own constituency. Unfortunately for the Congress, in the prevailing circumstances, no other state offers that sort of security for Gandhi, except Kerala.

States in north, west and central India are the BJP’s bastions. In 2014, on a 2000-km stretch between Maharashtra and Haryana and the large swathe between Somnath and Gorakhpur, the Congress had won just six seats, two each in Maharashtra, MP and UP. In the east, regional parties have replaced the Congress and the BJP is fast emerging as their rival, edging Gandhi’s party out of the contest.

Even in the south, the Congress is out of the race in Andhra Pradesh and Telengana. It exists on its own in just two states—Karnataka and Kerala. In Karnataka, the BJP is the number one party in terms of seats won in the previous assembly and parliamentary elections.

In this scenario, where does Gandhi go in search of a ‘safe’ seat, a place where there is absolute guarantee of him winning without spending too much time campaigning for himself, and, more importantly, where the BJP has absolutely no chance of pinning him to the ground by sending a heavyweight to the contest? The answer to this question is simple: Only Kerala offers him a fail-safe option—a seat where the demographics favour the Congress and the BJP has minimal presence.

So, by electoral logic, Gandhi’s decision to contest from Wayanad, a minority-dominated constituency in Kerala is pragmatic. At least, it ensures Gandhi’s presence in the next parliament and also allow him to campaign without constantly watching his own back.

But the optics of his flight to a fail-safe constituency could be hugely damaging for the Congress and its president. In spite of the Congress spin that the decision is aimed at strengthening the party in the south, it will be perceived as tactical retreat. Because, in real life, Amethi still exists and Gandhi is expected not only to contest from there but also lead his party’s campaign in India’s largest state.

Gandhi is, of course, not the first to look for a second seat. In the past, many leaders have contested from two constituencies. But, their choice was seen as an aggressive act aimed at exploring new territories for the party. In 2014, for instance, when Narendra Modi contested from both Vadodara and Varanasi, it was seen as a decision to fire up the BJP’s campaign in UP and consolidate the Hindu vote with the choice of India’s most ancient as well as holy cities. He was seen to be taking the battle to all his rivals—Congress, SP, BSP and, since Arvind Kejriwal too decided to contest from Varanasi, the AAP on their home turf.

Gandhi’s decision, however, would be perceived as an act of desertion, primarily because the Congress chief has chosen the most convenient rival—the Left—and a seat where its real adversary—the BJP— has a token presence.

The problem with Gandhi is unlike the non-existent probability of Amethi disappearing from the electoral map, his chances of losing in the family pocket borough are high. In 2014, Gandhi managed to retain Amethi by a slender margin of around one lakh votes. His vote share plummeted from 71.78% in 2009 to a mere 36.71%. In the 2017 assembly polls the Congress slid further, losing all the five seats in Amethi by huge margins, four of them to the BJP. The natural curve of Gandhi’s graph in Amethi is, thus, downwards.

Had Amethi been impregnable, Gandhi’s decision would not have been mocked and pilloried by his rivals. But, since doubts have risen over his ability to hold on to Amethi, his flight would discourage his own cadre in UP. Just a few months ago, he had sent his sister Priyanka to campaign in eastern UP. By looking for a safer option in addition to Amethi—a constituency east of Kanpur, he would also undermine his sibling’s efforts.

And, what exactly does he gain? Unlike UP, which has 80 seats, Kerala has just 20. Out of these, the Congress is contesting just 16. How many more seats can Gandhi add to the Congress tally by contesting from Wayanad? And even if he does, will it really matter who—Congress or the Left—wins more seats in Kerala? In the end, in case the NDA falls short of a majority in parliament, both these parties are expected to join hands to keep Modi out.

The Congress argues since Wayanad shares its borders with Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, Gandhi’s decision would have a bearing on the outcome in three states. Only if the Congress performs better than expected in Karnataka—it is expected to win 14-15 seats with ally JD(S) and helps the DMK sweep Tamil Nadu— would Gandhi’s decision be considered a masterstroke.

Otherwise it would be seen as a dumb act of self-preservation even at the cost of the party, opposition unity and the morale of the workers. But if he loses Amethi and adds no value to the campaign in the south, Gandhi would have nowhere to run.

Not even to Kerala.