Myanmar events do not augur well for India's security interests

Ever since the magisterial sounding “Neighbourhood First” policy was unveiled by the Modi dispensation, the principles that had been set out to guide it — principally by way of a core component constructed to foster cordial relations and synergetic economic development with its neighbours — seem to have run into a “fog of misunderstanding”.

To that end, two crucial neighbours of India, Bangladesh and Nepal, are moving away from India’s orbit by turning instead to China for aspects such as submarines, missile “maintenance” base (in the case of the former) and a “Himalayan strategic calculus” (in the case of the latter). Bhutan, too, signed an MoU with China to resolve its long-standing border issue. Although the steps that are being taken by some of India’s neighbours in themselves do not constitute threats, the fact that New Delhi has been unable to stave off Chinese influence from its neighbourhood certainly adds to the discomfiture of most Indian strategic observers.

Economic, security interests

The events in Myanmar, even after the passage of a year since the military takeover on February 1, 2021, pose a level of uncertainty to India. The situation does not augur well for India’s economic and security interests for which Myanmar is a crucial entity. Civil unrest continues to rage in Myanmar without signs of abatement. Indeed, one of the latest incidents has been the January 14, 2022 attack by the China National Army on the Myanmar army as well as the People’s Liberation Army (Manipur), an Indian insurgent group that had aligned itself with the Tatmadaw after the military takeover.

There has also been an acceleration by the People’s Defence Force in its anti-junta efforts, albeit this time around by targeting “the military and its assets”. However, its success would rest on the exiled National Unity Government’s (NUG) ability to cobble together a united front under a senior military leader from within the Tatmadaw who could be persuaded to defect from the Myanmar army.

On the international front, the case for Myanmar’s future has become murkier as a result of divided voices. Important countries such as China and Russia have “supported” the military takeover and India has abstained from voting against the military takeover. The ASEAN, too, in its summit on April 24, 2021 did not make much of the takeover and there was a clear “both-sidesism” in the manner in which the representatives “blamed” both the opposition and the military for the violence. Also, the fact that the summit was attended by Min Aung Hlaing clearly underscored that even the ASEAN “acknowledged” that henceforth they would have to work with the junta.

This was also substantiated by the non-admittance of the NUG, the shadow government that was formed to oppose the military in mid-April 2021. However, the most important aspect that was being closely watched was the 76th UN General Assembly which ended on September 27, 2021. The fact that Aung Thurein, who was appointed as the new Myanmarese envoy to the UN, “did not speak” on the last day as he was slated to, seems to be heralding an adverse sine qua non for the Tatmadaw. Such developments coming on the heels of a renewed “People’s Defensive War” call by the NUG would have adverse ramifications on Naypyidaw’s objective of consolidating its position in Myanmar as also in the international arena.

Recalibration exercise

But notwithstanding the developments that surround Myanmar’s future, India should ready itself with a strategy that is not only in line with its “Neighbourhood First” policy of which the “Act East” is a subset of, but also address the issue relating to the Indian Insurgent Groups billeted in Myanmar. To that end, a recalibration exercise that takes into consideration a matrix that balances out well between ideology and pragmatism is imperative. Such a policy should take into account the measures that Russia and China have taken to arm the Tatmadaw.

However, the dilemma that India would be faced with in the coming days is the manner in which the Ukraine crisis unfolds itself. Its abstention in the UN Security Council clearly showcases that it is taking the side of Russia because of its defence imperatives. But the question that is being asked is whether Chinese abstention in the Council vote would not endear Beijing to Moscow, permitting thereby it the much sought for leverage against India by way of possible pressure on Russia to soft pedal its defence aid to India. After all, New Delhi’s quandary – if Kyiv were to fall to the Russian forces – would be the side it would ultimately take.

Predicamant for New Delhi

On the one hand, there is apprehension that the United States may impose Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) (despite the fact that it seems to have understood “India’s compulsions”) on it for continuing its defence relationship with Russia and on the other face the possibility of a Kremlin “cooling off” towards it if it is seen to be ambivalent in the face of a complete Ukraine takeover by Russia. Furthermore, there would be a decisive strategic shift of the United States from the Indo-Pacific region to Europe, leaving India’s backyard vulnerable to inimical Chinese moves. Indeed, it is this “ambivalence” which has not only created a predicament for New Delhi even in its Myanmar policy.

Realpolitik, it is understood, is realpolitik and, therefore, Myanmar – regardless of who governs its polity – is naturally the crucial linchpin for India’s “Act East Policy”. Even the much-publicised demolition of the Indian insurgent camps in Myanmar has experienced a 180-degree turn with many outfits coming into an agreement with the junta.

The optimism that had marked the manner in which the Myanmar army had conducted Op Sunrise-I and Sunrise-II which demolished the Indian insurgent camps in Myanmar seems to have evaporated after the military takeover in Myanmar. It is, therefore, high time for India. It must enter into retrospection and recalibrate and re-align its strategic objectives. A non-comprehension of such an imperative would sound the death knell of the “Neighbourhood First” policy that it had grandiosely unfurled on May 26, 2014 when Modi first took oath in office.

(Jaideep Saikia is a well-known conflict analyst and celebrated author of several best-selling books and Fellow, Irregular Warfare Initiative, West Point, USA)

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