Kargil war 25th year: No progress in India’s intel structure, says defence analyst

“This failure to learn from past mistakes has manifested in conflicts like Galwan recently,” pointed out Commodore C Uday Bhaskar, a veteran defence analyst in an exclusive interview with The Federal, as he delves into the lasting impact of the Kargil conflict, which marked its 25th anniversary on July 26.

Commodore Bhaskar, who is also director of the New Delhi-based Society for Policy Studies, reflected on the lessons learned from Operation Vijay, the current state of India’s defence capabilities, and the controversial Agnipath scheme.

Reflecting on the significance of Kargil on its 25th year, I believe, it stands as a pivotal moment in India’s security history. To understand its full impact, we must place it in a broader historical context. From the moment India gained independence in 1947, its territorial integrity faced challenges. The first of these emerged as early as October 1947, and this issue has persisted over the decades.

Kargil in 1999 was a stark reminder of these ongoing challenges, particularly concerning Jammu and Kashmir.

As we revisit Kargil in 2024, several key aspects emerge. Chief among them is the extraordinary valour of Indian soldiers — particularly the young officers —who managed to turn a dire situation into a success. Their bravery and sacrifice should be honoured, and we must remember those who lost their lives, those who continue to grieve, and the veterans who were injured.

However, there are aspects of the Kargil conflict that are less admirable. The war exposed significant intelligence lapses. India was caught off guard not only during Kargil but also during the Galwan clash, highlighting systemic issues in intelligence adequacy. This is a crucial lesson from Kargil: India's higher defence management, from the Prime Minister to the Cabinet Committee on Security, has struggled to address intelligence deficiencies effectively.

The Kargil conflict, which concluded on July 26, 1999, led to the establishment of the Kargil Review Committee, chaired by K Subrahmanyam, with Lt Gen Hazari and journalist George Varghese as members. Their report, completed within six months and made largely public, provided an important contribution to India's security literature.

Notably, the report’s title, "From Surprise to Reckoning," reflects the gravity of the challenge rather than framing it as a victory.

Despite the report's recommendations, 25 years later, there has been insufficient progress in reforming India’s intelligence structure. This failure to learn from past mistakes has manifested in subsequent conflicts like Galwan. As India approaches its 75th year as a republic, the ongoing issues with intelligence adequacy remain a pressing concern that must be addressed to prevent future surprises and ensure national security.

Intelligence is a multi-faceted domain, and with the advent of technologies like AI, its complexity has only increased. For India, this underscores the necessity of developing a robust national intelligence capability. Today, intelligence is not solely a military concern but a broader national imperative.

While we rightly celebrate the valour of Indian soldiers, it has become increasingly apparent, though reluctantly, that the strategic leadership during conflicts may not have always met the required standards. Each year brings new insights into past wars, yet India has struggled to openly publish and disclose critical records, a vital practice for any democracy.

For instance, after the 1962 war with China, the Henderson-Brooks Report was commissioned to review the military aspects of the conflict. However, despite promises from successive governments, this report remains largely inaccessible to the public, with only pirated versions available. Similarly, in the case of the Kargil conflict, the official history remains unpublished. Our understanding of the war is largely shaped by personal accounts, biographies, and memoirs, rather than an authoritative official version.

Current discussions in forums around Delhi reveal a spectrum of opinions. Some retired officials argue that while intelligence inputs were provided to the Army during Kargil, they were not adequately acted upon. This type of speculation underscores the need for a more informed and transparent debate on these critical issues.

India must take ownership of its lapses and foster an open, informed discussion on intelligence and military strategy. Only through such transparency can we ensure continuous improvement and preparedness for future challenges.

Kargil stands out as a conflict with several distinctive and anomalous features, which reflect both the evolving geopolitical landscape and the unique circumstances of the time.

One of the most notable aspects of the Kargil War is its timing. In May 1998, both India and Pakistan declared their nuclear capabilities. This development marked a significant shift in regional dynamics, setting the stage for the Kargil conflict that erupted shortly thereafter. Less than a year after the nuclear declarations, the Lahore Accord was signed in 1999, with Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visiting Pakistan to meet with then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Despite these diplomatic efforts, the Kargil operation, orchestrated by General Pervez Musharraf, unfolded as a bold and stealthy manoeuvre.

The juxtaposition of a nuclear-armed environment with a conventional war was unprecedented. The conflict was marked by high-stakes diplomacy and military engagement. Notably, while there was nuclear sabre-rattling, the war remained limited in scope and did not escalate into a nuclear confrontation. Full credit must be given to Prime Minister Vajpayee for managing the situation and even to Nawaz Sharif for accepting the defeat and scaling back.

The aftermath of Kargil had profound implications for India’s international standing. The event catalysed a shift in global perceptions, notably reflected in the US President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000. Addressing the Indian Parliament, Clinton highlighted India's growing stature while criticising Pakistan's support for nuclear-empowered terrorism. This period marked a turning point for India, enhancing its global profile and reinforcing its position as a key player on the world stage.

The Kargil conflict ushered in a period of dehyphenation between India and Pakistan. The political sagacity of Vajpayee played a crucial role in this shift, leading to a distinct separation in how the two countries were perceived and treated internationally. This reconfiguration paved the way for significant developments, including the US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement of 2005. This agreement was a landmark event, signalling an increasing distinction between India and Pakistan and underscoring India's rising global prominence.

India needs to significantly increase its defence budget. The current expenditure, which is less than 2.5 per cent of GDP, is inadequate. The argument that reducing the defence budget could free up resources to create more jobs is flawed. While job creation is a critical issue, it should not come at the expense of national security.

The decline in capital expenditure (capex) within the defence budget is particularly concerning. As the rupee weakens against the US dollar, the purchasing power for international defence equipment diminishes. This situation is compounded by India’s current underperformance in producing the necessary military equipment domestically.

These factors collectively undermine our defence capabilities, which could lead to a situation similar to the Kargil conflict, where we faced shortages of arms and ammunition. Ensuring that both our equipment ("the gun") and our personnel ("the soldier behind the gun") are well-supported is essential for maintaining national security.

This issue warrants urgent and thorough debate in Parliament. Strengthening defence funding is crucial to avoiding future vulnerabilities and ensuring that India's military readiness is not compromised.

Based on the available information, it appears that the scheme in question was implemented hastily. The general consensus suggests that it might have been more prudent to pilot the project before a full rollout. Retired personnel should exercise caution as they may not have complete visibility into the ongoing developments within the system. Given that the initial four-year cycle has not yet concluded, it is advisable to await a thorough assessment before drawing definitive conclusions.

From a practical standpoint, particularly concerning the Navy and, to some extent, the Air Force, the current training duration for specialised roles—such as an artificer—can take between 7 to 8 years. If it takes 7 years to train an individual, retaining them for only 5 to 7 years before they are eligible to decide whether to continue their service may not be optimal. A four-year programme might not be sufficiently effective for such roles.

Therefore, it is essential to review this scheme objectively, focusing on its efficacy rather than on political pressures or demands for revision by parties such as Janata Dal(United) or Samjawadi Party (SP).