American voters will decide Europe's future

The US election may widen rifts between the United States and Europe, with concerns about trade, defence, and geopolitical cooperation.

Europe is watching closely as the US presidential election approaches. Since Donald Trump’s nomination as the Republican candidate, there has been growing talk of the need to “Trump-proof” Europe and transatlantic institutions.

As in 2020, Europe is wary of a return to the pre-Biden era of US antagonism.

The “Old Continent” faces a daunting list of challenges, from the war in Ukraine to violence in the Middle East, alongside rising Euroscepticism and populism at both the EU and national levels.

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New strategy

Meanwhile, the EU is grappling with a complex recovery programme, reflected in Mario Draghi’s recent report, 'The Future of European Competitiveness'.

Europe’s growing challenges Draghi’s report calls for a new industrial strategy, urging unprecedented investment and new shared debt to meet Europe’s industrial and defence needs.

Many have drawn comparisons to the US-backed post-World War Two Marshall Plan, noting the scale of investment required.

The Marshall Plan is increasingly referenced in global politics, often in comparison to initiatives like China’s Belt and Road, the EU’s Next Generation programme, and even the Biden administration’s post-pandemic fiscal policies.

Some are already talking about a "new Marshall Plan" to finance Ukraine's post-war reconstruction.

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The Marshall Plan nostalgia

While a Federal Reserve study suggested that the Marshall Plan, or European Recovery Program (ERP) may not have been the key to Europe’s post-war recovery, it has come to symbolise large-scale economic commitment and the enduring bond between the United States and Europe.

It is somewhat peculiar that this attention is resurging as transatlantic relations are weakening.

This "Marshall Plan nostalgia" first surfaced in many comments around 2017, when the 70th anniversary of George Marshall’s speech coincided with the early days of Trump’s “America First” presidency.

As the US election nears, this nostalgia is even more pronounced.

Joe Biden’s administration marked a departure from Trump, even in terms of style and language, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine reinvigorated transatlantic ties, reviving NATO’s image among the European allies. However, underlying tensions remain.

Longstanding tensions

Tensions surfaced in the economic sphere, for instance, regarding the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) 2022.

Europe resented how the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was conducted, while the signing of the AUKUS agreement on Pacific security among Australia, the UK and the US the following month raised French anger and was widely criticised by the European institutions.

Divergences between the United States and Europe highlight how the former Cold War allies’ positions are now developing along different paths, irrespective of who is in the White House.

This shift began in the 1990s and became more apparent during George W Bush’s presidency, continuing with his successors. Over time, their visions of the international system have diverged, and they have become economic and technological competitors.

At the same time, Washington’s strategic interests moved away from Europe, focusing since the early 2010s on the Indo-Pacific region to tackle the emergence of China and its growing regional and global ambitions.

Trump vs Harris: uncertain outcomes for Europe

The outcome of the upcoming US election is unlikely to alter this trajectory. Trump’s well-known scepticism of Europe and the EU will likely reignite tensions, especially over trade and defence spending.

However, a Harris victory would not guarantee smoother relations. The Democrats no longer view protectionism as taboo, and defending American jobs—a slogan borrowed from Trump’s 2016 campaign—remains a central focus.

On key issues, from the Middle East to the US-EU industrial cooperation, Harris has been ambiguous, and while the tone may soften, policies might be less cooperative than the European partners imagine.

A fragile transatlantic bond

This is not just about the “Marshall Plan spirit”. Over the years, US-Europe relations have grown increasingly ambiguous.

Diverging interests and competition are now structural features of the relationship. However, as Draghi's report highlights, there is still room for cooperation.

On issues like climate, trade, industry, and technology, the US and Europe share common goals but often pursue radically different approaches.

This has led to independent policies that sometimes harm each other’s economies or create misalignments that hinder deeper integration. Cooperation is not out of the question, but political dynamics heavily influence its potential for success.

In the long term, the very concept of a "transatlantic community" is at stake. The Western world’s values and commitment to a rules-based (“liberal”) international order have historically been anchored in the US-Europe axis.

Today, the challenges facing this axis are both a cause and a consequence of the weakening US-led global order.

At a cultural level, this reflects a crisis of what British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin in 1948 called the "spiritual federation of the West".

On a practical level, shifting power dynamics are prompting a reevaluation of alliances, with the United States in relative decline and partners reassessing their ties.

The 'natural' link against a loose convergence of interests

Ideologically, the US-Europe bond remains strong, with both sides clinging to the principles of the liberal world order.

The EU’s definition of China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance” is not very different from the US one, with the current National Security Strategy (2022) labelling it as “the only cmpetitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it”.

Equally, human rights, the rule of law, and the promotion of liberal democracy remain shared principles, just like multilateralism and the commitment to open markets, security and monetary cooperation.

But strains are increasingly visible. The US is becoming more critical of multilateralism and free trade, while nationalism is rising in Europe, challenging the EU’s integration process.

Even as some Eurosceptic forces shift their tactics to weaken the EU from within, old-fashioned anti-Europeanism remains strong, as small but vociferous parties like Polexit, Italexit or the EU Exit Party for Austria testify.

The difficulties faced by the Von der Leyen Commission and the success of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK party in Britain reflect the enduring appeal of populism.

In this context, invoking the Marshall Plan feels both chronologically and ideologically distant.

More than the "natural" link between the two parts of the “West”, today’s US-Europe relations reflect a loose convergence of interests. Whether this will change remains uncertain.

The growing distance between the two sides is driven more by structural factors than by short-term political shifts, making a return to previous patterns hardly possible, regardless of the election outcome.

Yet, the continued reference to the European Recovery Program underscores its historical relevance and its role in shaping a vision of the transatlantic bargain that, from the European perspective, seemed more manageable and less fraught with tension.